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Introduction
Berle and Means (1932) claim that the modern corporation’s main characteristic
feature lies in the separation between ownership, scattered among a great number of
small outside shareholders, and control, exerted by professional managers owning, at
best, a paltry fraction of its capital. Thereafter, a huge literature on corporate finance
emerged, taking for granted that this characterisation of the agency problem,
circumscribing it to the potential conflict between shareholders and management,
fitted in all countries. Since the 1980s, however, and gaining momentum in the 1990s,
studies have been focusing, both at the theoretical and empirical level, on the agency
problem between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, whose holding
of a large block of voting shares in the firm confers them power and incentives for
expropriating minority shareholders.
To a great extent the debate around the costs and benefits of firms’ shareholding
concentration can be understood under the lens of the trade-off between relinquishing
liquidity and risk diversification on the one hand and incentives to monitor
management on the other hand. Indeed, it can be argued that holders of a big chunk of
shares contribute to create wealth for the firm: if they are outsiders, they would have
the incentives to monitor the managers, mitigating therefore the free-rider problem; if
they are managers themselves, they would have direct incentives to be efficient, on
top of signalling to the market that their interests are aligned with the firm’s profit
maximisation. Nonetheless, by entailing the concentration of investors’ wealth on the
ownership of a large stake in the firms, the renunciation of the diversification benefits
would reward only if it gave rise to private benefits of control, such as those resulting
from the diversion of the firm’s assets – the so-called “tunnelling” effect.
However copious, the literature focusing on the effects of the concentration of the
firm’s ownership and control in the hands of its largest shareholders on its
performance is far from definitive, except perhaps for the negative effect of the
wedge between cash-flow rights and voting rights. One of the pioneering analyses on
that issue is Morck et al. (1988). They distinguish two opposing effects stemming
from ownership concentration on corporate performance: the positive incentive effect
and the negative “entrenchment” effect, the latter associated with the private benefits
controlling shareholders obtain at the expense of minority shareholders. They provide
empirical evidence, based on a sample of U.S. firms, that the relationship between
managerial stake and the valuation of the firm is non-monotonic. For levels of
managerial shareholdings below 5 percent these two variables are positively
correlated, suggesting that the incentive effect overwhelms the entrenchment effect.
For managerial ownership varying between 5 and 25 percent the entrenchment effect
dominates, rendering the relationship negative (a manager possessing a small faction
of the cash-flow rights would be able to control the company and expropriate
minority shareholders). Above 25 percent managerial ownership, the relationship
becomes again positive.2
Analysing the ownership structure of large publicly traded companies in 27
developed countries, La Porta et al (1999) document that, except in the United States
and the United Kingdom – countries wherein the common law prevails – the great
majority of companies around the world are controlled by large shareholders.
Moreover, as a rule, these investors’ voting rights exceed materially their cash-flow
rights. Hence, so they argue, Berle and Means’ widely-accepted view of corporations
would only be suitable to those two countries, prevailing in the rest of the world as
the main agency problem the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders by
controlling shareholders.
Bianco e Casavola (1999) in turn investigate the effect of both pyramidal structures
and the largest shareholder’s identity on Italian firms’ returns. They contend that ex
ante the net effect of pyramidal structures on the firm performance is ambiguous. On
the one hand, that type of structure leaves plenty of room for expropriating outside
investors and for dynamic inefficiency – since it facilitates the controlling
shareholder’s entrenchment and hinders her contestability. On the other hand,
pyramidal arrangements may overcome constraints surround the financing of good
projects because, creating an internal capital market, they mitigate the informational
asymmetry. Their empirical model provides two findings. First, the significance of
the negative effect on the rate of return on both investment and sales of the dummy
representing controlling shareholder holding 66 percent or more of the firm’s voting
rights. Second, belonging to an economic group tends to engender a significant
negative impact on the firm’s return rate on investment.
In the same vein, Claessens et al. (2002) attempt to disentangle the incentive and
entrenchment effects of large ownership using a sample of 1,301 publicly traded
corporations in eight East Asian countries. Their regression analysis found that the
firms’ market-to-book ratio increases with the share of cash-flow rights in the hands
of the largest shareholder (the positive incentive effect) and decreases with the share
of control rights (the negative entrenchment effect). They also show that deviations
between control rights and cash flow rights for the largest shareholders tend to reduce
corporate valuation, and that the value discount increases with the size of the wedge,
suggesting that discrepancies in rights widen agency costs when there is a controlling
shareholder.
Further evidence on the links between ownership structures and performance of firms
is furnished by La Porta et al. (2002). They build a model to evaluate the influence of
both legal protection of outside investors and controlling shareholder’s cash-flow
rights on corporate valuation, applying it to data about 539 corporations from 27
developed countries. Using Tobin’s q as a proxy for the valuation of the firms, they
show that higher fractions of cash-flow ownership by controlling shareholders (a
measure of their incentives to maximise firm value) are associated with higher
valuations, notably where investor protection is poor. Furthermore, they conclude that
deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights by the controlling shareholder
may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders.
Based on a sampling universe comprising 5,829 Korean firms subject to outside
auditing during the period of 1993-1997, Joh (2003) carried out a microanalysis of the
determinants of their profitability rates. Controlling for firm and industry
characteristics as well for macroeconomic effects, she found that firms with low
ownership concentration tended to yield low rates of return. Likewise, firms with a
high disparity between control rights and ownership rights were also leaned to low
profitability rates. Additionally, her investigation furnishes some empirical support
for non-linear ownership effects on firm profitability.3
Some analysts have pointed out that investors’ poor legal protection can magnify
agency costs by facilitating the leverage of voting power over ownership.
Notwithstanding the advantage of promoting monitoring without impairing liquidity,
the divergence of the “one-share-one-vote” tenet has the drawback of providing the
large shareholder with incentive and power for expropriating minority shareholders.
This happens because the gap between cash-flow and voting rights enables the large
shareholder to control a firm with a relatively small direct participation in its capital,
making it much more rewarding expropriating minority shareholders than trying to
maximise firm’s profits. Among the devices more often used to create a gap between
voting rights and ownership, the following can be mentioned: (1) pyramidal
arrangements of ownership – the most prevalent according La Porta et al. (1999); (2)
dual-class shares; and (3) cross-shareholdings. Bebchuk (1999), Bebchuk et al.
(1999), La Porta et al. (1999) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2002), for instance,
have understood pyramids as a mechanism for expropriating minority shareholders.
Contesting this view, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) argue that pyramids operate
primarily as a means of ensuring financing to new enterprises. A family may tap the
profits of a firm they already control to establish a new enterprise, sharing with the
former company’s shareholders the “security benefits” of the new one, that is, the
returns generated by the latter that are not appropriated as private benefits by the
controlling family. Undeveloped capital markets and low security benefits of the new
company, characteristic features of countries wherein the investor protection is poor,
may favour the emergence of pyramids, which could represent an efficient response
to financial market failures. Firms requiring high levels of investment and/or with low
profitability ratios would be more willing to be involved in pyramidal arrangements
of ownership. Besides providing higher payoff to the controlling family and implying
lower security benefits to outside investors, firms with these characteristics face
stronger financial constraints and, consequently, are those most benefited from intra-
group transfer of resources.
This paper has as its main objective to investigate the effects of ownership and
control concentration as well as of characteristics of the controlling shareholders on
the performance of Brazilian limited liability companies. The analysis relied on data
compiled from 4,478 reports these firms filed to the Brazilian agency responsible for
securities and exchange regulation. As the adopted sample provides data for a large
number of companies (more than 600) for every year from 1997 to 2002, panel data
analysis was carried out. As possible contributions of this paper, it can be pinpointed
the sample comprehensiveness (covering six years and including the whole set of
limited liability companies, and not only companies with shares traded at the stock
market) and the methodology employed both to reckon deviation of rights of the
largest ultimate shareholder and to test the potential links between ownership and
control structures and firms’ rates of return.
Besides this introduction, the paper encompasses five additional sections. Section I
describes the data set explored to undertake the investigation and specifies the
methodology followed to calculate rights of cash flow and of voting. Section II
presents some relevant findings related to Brazilian firms’ ownership and control
structures. Section III introduces the econometric model and the following section
reports the principal results of the panel data analysis on the relationship between
ownership and control characteristics and firm performance. The closing section
concludes and makes some comments on the main challenges corporate governance
encounters in Brazil.4
I. Data Sources and Methodology
The data set used for the empirical research was the “Informativo Anual” (IAN) and
the “Demonstrações Financeiras Padronizadas” (DFP) limited liability companies in
Brazil are required to file annually to the “Comissão de Valores Imobiliários” (CVM)
– the Brazilian capital market watchdog. The analysis relied on data collected out of a
sample embracing all the firms that furnished these forms to the CVM. The
investigation based on 4,478 IANs and the same number of DFPs. The number of
firms that complied with these disclosure requirements was 670 in 1997, 836 in 1998,
807 in 1999, 772 in 2000, 727 in 2001 and 666 in 2002. Among other types of data,
the IANs disclose: i) the company’s shares of capital held by the largest shareholders;
ii) the identities of the directors and the top executives; iii) directors’ compensation
and whether they have participation in the company’s capital; iv) whether there is any
agreement among a group of shareholders; v) whether the company issued preferred
stocks without voting rights; vi) companies’ general information – such as their main
activity. The DFP in turn contain: i) the balance sheets; ii) the income statement; iii)
the sources and uses of funds; iv) changes in the net worth; v) and the board’s report.
As regards the methodology that guided the empirical investigation (the key concepts
and definitions as well as the main criteria and techniques to deal with the data),
despite having drawn extensively on the corresponding literature, it endeavoured to
take into account peculiarities embracing Brazilian corporate environment.
The first step was to identify the “largest ultimate shareholder” (henceforth LUS) for
every sample company for every year. LUS is defined as the shareholder who holds
the largest stake, directly and indirectly, in the firm’s voting rights. By indirect
ownership or pyramidal ownership of a firm it should be understood the ownership
structure showing at least one limited liability company between the company under
scrutiny and its corresponding ultimate shareholder. Once reconstituted the chain of
share stakes in intermediate firms leading the ultimate shareholder to the firm
analysed, and verified whether she was a controlling shareholder, a diagram was
drawn to represent the shareholding structure, wherein were cash-flow rights and
voting rights of the main shareholders in each of the firms belonging to the ownership
chain were specified. The LUSs were classified into six categories: i) an individual or
a family (people connected by blood or marriage); ii) the state or agencies
subordinated to it; iii) a foreign firm; iv) a partnership; v) a mutual fund; vi) a pension
fund; vii) an offshore firm; viii) a foundation or a cooperative; ix) a privately-held
company; x) a legally-registered voting agreement among shareholders.
Before presenting how the ultimate shareholder’s voting rights and cash-flow rights
were reckoned, it should be noted that companies in Brazil have been allowed to issue
preferred stocks that may not entitle their holders to vote. Whilst voting rights are
mandatory for nominated common stock (ações ordinárias nominativas, henceforth
ON), holders of preferred stocks (ações preferenciais nominativas, PN) can be
awarded no voting rights. According to the Brazilian corporate law before its
amendment in 2001, a firm was allowed to issue up to two-thirds of its capital as PN
with no voting rights, implying that control could be ensured to a shareholder owning
just one-sixth of the firm’s capital. Indeed, this sort of deviation from the one-share
one-vote rule has been largely employed by Brazilian listed companies.
The calculation of the ultimate shareholder’s stake in the firm’s cash-flow rights
depends on whether there is a structure of pyramidal ownership. If the company being
analysed involves no pyramidal arrangement, the fraction of the ultimate
shareholder’s cash-flow rights equals to the ratio between the number of shares she
owns – the sum of her ON and PN shares – and the firm’s total number of shares.5
Having pyramidal ownership, the stake in cash-flow rights is determined by the
product of the percentages of shareholdings each firm has in the next one. For
example, if firm A has 60 percent of its capital owned by firm B, which in turn has 80
percent of its capital held by firm C, therefore firm C is the firm A’s ultimate
shareholder with 48 percent of its overall capital (0.8 x 0.6 = 0.48) and thus with the
same percentage of its overall cash-flow rights.
As regards voting rights, as the great majority of Brazilian firms have an ultimate
owner holding voting rights exceeding 50 percent, the cut-off point of 50 percent was
adopted as the criterion to distinguish between firms with dispersed ownership and
firms with an ultimate controlling shareholder. Hence a firm is said to have an
ultimate controlling shareholder if it has a shareholder controlling directly and
indirectly at least 50 percent of the firm’s total voting rights.
1 The calculation of
voting rights depends on whether the LUS is also the controlling shareholder. If that
is not the case, the reckoning is analogous to that for cash-flow rights, that is, the
product of the percentages of voting rights along the chain of control. For example, if
C holds 20 percent of firm B’s voting capital, and firm B holds in turn 80 percent of
firm A’s voting capital, then C is the ultimate shareholder of firm A (but it is not its
controlling shareholder) with 16 percent (0.20x0.80) of firm A’s voting rights.
Contrariwise, if the ultimate shareholder is also a controlling shareholder, the
percentage of voting rights is determined by the percentage of voting rights the last
intermediate along the chain of control has in the sample firm. For instance, if C
controls 60 percent of the voting rights in the firm B, which in turn holds 80 percent
of firm A’s overall voting rights, then C is the firm A’s ultimate shareholder as well
as its controlling shareholder, commanding 80 percent of firm A’s voting rights.
In order to illustrate this approach, it is briefly reported below how the rights of
control and the rights of cash flow (and the wedge between them) were figured out
for two companies representing one of the most intricate cases of the whole sample.
They are Norquisa and Politeno, both belonging in 2001 to the same control chain, as
can be observed by Figure 1. These companies embrace pyramidal schemes, a circle
cross-shareholding (comprising Politeno, Norquisa, Copene, Econômico and
Conepar), and shareholder agreements. Furthermore, they involve several types of
shareholders: families, foreign corporations, holdings, partnerships, and limited
liability companies. Among the companies exhibited in that figure, thirteen belong to
the 2001 CVM sample.
In the case of Politeno, the control is ensured through a voting agreement among
Sumitomo, Itochu, Conepar and SPP Nemo. The first two companies are Japanese;
SSP Nemo is a Brazilian company entirely controlled by the Feffer family; and
Conepar is also a Brazilian firm but is controlled by Norquisa through a pyramidal
scheme that results in a circle cross-shareholding. Given that Norquisa has no
controlling shareholder according to the adopted criteria, the effective participants of
the agreement are, besides the two Japanese corporations, the Feffer family and
Norquisa. The Feffer Family has in turn a stake in the Politeno by means of two
channels: via SPP Nemo and via Norquisa. The longest pyramidal chain in that case
comprises six intermediate companies between the Feffer Family and Politeno:
Polibrasil, Polipropileno, Norquisa, Copene, Econômico, and Conepar. For Politeno,
cash flow rights were reckoned to exceed voting rights by 49.7 percentage points.
                                                
1 For La Porta et al (1999), a firm has a controlling shareholder if a shareholder has direct and indirect
voting rights exceeding 10 percent or 20 percent. Besides those two cutoff points, Claessens et al
(2002) adopt the 40 percent cutoff to define control for East Asian companies.6
Figure 1: Ownership and Voting Rights of Norquisa and Politeno
Source: Elaborated out of the reports these firms filed to CVM
Notation
a) Each rectangle represents either a shareholder or the company under scrutiny.
b) Arrows linking the rectangles indicate ownership and voting relationships: the origin from which
they come informs who controls/owns; the other extremity what is controlled/owned.
c) Percentages outside the brackets refer to the fraction of the company’ voting capital the shareholder
owns; percentages within the brackets refer to the same shareholder’s cash flow rights. When there is
only one figure with no brackets, cash-flow rights and voting rights are equal.
II. Some Findings about the Brazilian firms’ Ownership and Control Structures
This section presents some descriptive statistics that help to portray the sample firms’
ownership and control profiles. For the whole set of firms that filed their IANs to
CVM over the period 1997-2002, the following main aggregate were found:
a) The LUS’s cash-flow rights average 51.6 percent and the LUS’s voting rights
average 72.9 percent, implying an average discrepancy between rights of voting and
cash flow of 21.3 percentage points.
b) Companies whose shares are traded at the Brazilian stock exchange, Bovespa,
show similar percentages vis-à-vis the whole sample: the mean concentrations of
cash-flow rights and voting rights are lower, respectively, 5.2 and 2.2 percentage7
points, resulting in a larger wedge of rights (3.0 percent points) (see Table 1).
Changes in the percentages of rights throughout the period are minimal.
Table 1
Cash-Flow Rights, Voting Rights, and Discrepancies between Rights
Limited Liability Firms and Firms Listed at Bovespa
Mean Percentage over the Period 1997-2002
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
All Firms 71.0 71.6 73.7 72.7 73.7 75.0 72.9 Voting Rights
Listed 69.1 70.5 71.6 70.4 70.7 72.0 70.7
All Firms 49.3 50.4 51.0 51.2 53.5 54.9 51.6 Cash Flow Rights
Listed 44.5 45.7 46.3 46.4 47.1 48.1 46.4
All Firms 21.8 21.2 22.8 21.5 20.2 20.1 21.3 Divergence
Listed 24.6 24.7 25.3 24.0 23.5 23.9 24.3
c) Firms wherein the LUS holds more than 50 percent of the firm’s capital represent
47.9 percent of the sample firms over the period (for firms listed at the Bovespa, it is
41.8 percent. Firms whose LUS holds more than 90% percent of the firm’s capital
account for 18.4 percent of the sampled firms (10.0 percent for Bovespa-listed firms).
Only in 25.9 percent of the sampled companies (29.2 percent for Bovespa-listed
companies) the LUS holds cash-flow rights exceeding 25 percent.
d) In average terms, there is one controlling shareholder in 77.6 percent of the firms
analysed, 77.3 percent in the case of listed companies (see Table 2). 39.0 percent of
the firms have a LUS owning more than 90 percent of the firm’s voting capital (31.8
percent for Bovespa-listed companies). These percentages are very high as compared
with those obtained by Claessens et al. (2002, p. 2748) – for a 40 percent cut-off, only
23 percent of their sample of Asian companies had a controlling shareholder.
Following the 20 percent cut-off adopted by La Porta et al. (1999) to define control,
less than 6 percent of the CVM sample (less than 7 percent of the Bovespa-listed
companies) do not have controlling ultimate shareholder. For a 10 percent cut-off,
99.6 percent of the whole firms of the sample and 99.75 percent of all Bovespa-listed
sample firms have a controlling shareholder.
Table 2
Distribution of Largest Ultimate Shareholders’ Voting Rights
Mean Percentage over the Period 1997-2002
Percentage of the Overall Capital Limited Liability Listed Firms
 10% or less 0.4 0.2
 > 10% and ≤ 25% 5.6 6.8
 > 25% and ≤ 50% 16.4 15.7
Total for ≤ 50% 22.4 22.7
 > 50% and ≤ 75% 22.1 25.9
 > 75% and ≤ 90% 16.5 19.7
 > 90% and ≤ 100% 39.0 31.8
Total for > 50% and ≤ 100% 77.6 77.3
Total 100.0 100.0
e) With respect to the wedge of rights for the LUS, Table 3 evinces that in average
terms for the whole period it exceeds 10 percentage points in 55.9 percent of the
sample firms (in 64.9 percent of the Bovespa-listed companies). There occurs
deviation higher than 25 and 50 percentage points in, respectively, 36.2 percent and8
13.2 percent of the sample firms (and in, respectively, 42.4 percent and 15.5 percent
of the Bovespa-listed companies).
Table 3
Distribution of the Largest Ultimate Shareholders’ Divergence of Rights
Mean Percentage over the Period 1997-2002
Percentage of the Overall Capital Limited Liability Listed Firms
 Less than 0% 3.8 4.7
 Equal to 0% (no discrepancy) 20.7 10.3
 > 0 and ≤ 10% 19.6 20.1
 > 10% and ≤ 25% 19.7 22.5
 > 25% and ≤ 50% 23.0 26.9
Total for ≤ 50% 86.8 84.5
 > 50% and ≤ 75% 9.0 11.9
 > 75% and ≤ 100% 4.3 3.5
Total for > 50% and ≤ 100% 13.2 15.5
Total 100.0 100.0
f) Concerning the identity of the largest ultimate shareholders, families predominate
among them, averaging 54.7 percent over the period 1997-2002. Foreign investors
(averaging 18.4 percent), governments (7.5 percent) and mutual funds (5.2 percent)
followed in importance (see Table 4).
Table 4
The Largest Ultimate Shareholders’ Identity
(Percentage)
Category of Shareholder 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL
Government 9.0 8.1 7.2 6.6 7.0 7.5 7.5
Foreign Investors 14.5 18.9 19.6 19.7 19.1 17.7 18.4
Families 58.2 55.3 54.0 54.7 53.5 52.9 54.7
Foundations 2.5 1.0 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.1 1.7
Mutual Funds 1.9 4.8 6.2 5.8 6.3 6.0 5.2
Pension Funds 2.8 1.6 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.0 2.0
Privately-Held Firms 6.3 5.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.6 4.5
Others 4.8 4.9 6.1 5.8 6.6 7.4 5.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
g) There are significant inter-industry discrepancies of the largest ultimate
shareholders’ average cash-flow rights. While these means for transport and financial
industries (65.3 and 60.7 percent) exceed significantly the overall mean (51.6
percent), the opposite happens for telecommunications and petroleum (32.9 and 33.8
percent). For the largest ultimate shareholders’ average voting rights, inter-industry
disparities are lower: commerce (83.7 percent), agriculture (79.0 percent), public
utilities 77.8 percent) and banking (76.3 percent) present means above the overall
mean (72.9 percent), which in turn is much higher than that for petroleum (62.0
percent). As regards the LUS’s separation of rights, the leaders are
telecommunications (averaging 39.0 percent, though the mean for 1999 is 49.7
percent), paper and cellulose (33.4 percent) and agriculture (31.5 percent) while the
smallest wedges are observed for cement and glass (13.9 percent), transport (12.8
percent) and banking (15.6 percent).9
h) Companies whose all shares granted voting rights represent on average 31.4 of the
sample (se Table 5). In more than two-thirds of the sample firms, all PN shares have
no voting rights. It is also noteworthy that on average 36.5 percent of the companies
have more than 50 percent of their respective capital accounted for shares with no
voting rights. Nonetheless, the number of firms with this type of characteristic has
been decreasing since 1998 (from 314 to 235 in 2002).
Table 5
PN Shares: 1997-2002 (percentage)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
 Firms with no PN shares 25.7 26.3 27.8 28.6 28.3 30.3 27.8
 Firms with PN shares (1) 74.3 73.7 72.2 71.4 71.7 69.7 72.2
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Firms with VR PN shares (2) 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.8 5.9 4.7 5.2
  -PN with and without VRs (3) 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.4 1.6
  -All PN with VRs 3.3 3.3 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.3 3.6
 Firms w/All PN without VRs (4)=(1)–(2) 69.7 68.7 67.0 65.5 65.7 65.0 67.0
 Firms w/ PN without VRs (5) = (4) + (3) 71.0 70.3 68.5 67.4 67.8 66.4 68.6
 Firms whose % of non-VR PN
 - is 0% 29.0 29.7 31.5 32.6 32.2 33.6 31.4
 - lies between ]0 ;10%] 6.0 6.8 6.7 6.2 6.6 7.1 6.6
 - lies between ]10% ; 20%] 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.3
 - lies between ]20% ; 30%] 5.5 4.7 4.3 5.1 3.9 3.5 4.5
 - lies between ]30% ; 40%] 6.6 4.7 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.7 4.9
 - lies between ]40% ; 50%] 13.3 12.9 12.4 12.4 12.9 12.9 12.8
 - lies between ]50% ; 66.67%] 36.1 37.6 36.7 36.0 37.3 35.3 36.5
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Mean of PN over firm’s total K 33.4 33.4 32.4 32.0 32.6 31.6 32.6
 Mean of non-VR PN /firm’s K 32.0 31.7 30.8 30.3 30.8 30.0 31.0
i) Regarding companies involving pyramidal ownership structure (POS), their number
shrinks from 431 in 1998 to 314 in 2002, though they still represent 47.1 percent of
the total number of the sample in 2002. Defining the degree of pyramidal structure as
the number of intermediate companies between the firm under scrutiny and the LUS,
more than 50 percent of the firms belonging to POS show degrees higher than one
(see Table 6).
Table 6
Number and Percentage of Firms with Pyramidal Ownership Structure (POS)
Mean Degrees of POS: All Firms and Firms with POS
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1997-02
N% N% N% N% N% N%N%
Firms with POS 336 50,1 431 51,6 425 52,7 389 50,4 367 50,5 314 47,1 2262 50,5
Firms w/out POS 334 49,9 405 48,4 382 47,3 383 49,6 360 49,5 352 52,9 2216 49,4
Total 670 100,0 836 100,0 807 100,0 772 100,0 727 100,0 666 100,0 4478 100,0
Mean Degree: All 0.97 1.03 1.19 1.05 1.04 0.96 1.04
Mean Degr.: POS 1.93 1.99 2.26 2.09 2.05 2.04 2.0610
III. The Empirical Model
This section analyses the relationship between firms’ ownership and control
characteristics and their performance. More specifically, it deals with the following
issues:
a) Does the magnitude of the LUS’s cash flow rights vary positively with the firm’s
performance? As pointed out in the introduction, Claessens et al. (2002) found
evidence that higher cash-flow ownership translates into higher valuation of the firm.
The underlying rationale is that the LUS’s incentive to control the firm efficiently
becomes stronger when her stake in the firm’s capital increases.
b) Does the firm’s rate of return vary inversely with the share of voting rights held by
the LUS? The argument is that a higher fraction of voting rights enhances the room
for expropriating minority shareholders.
c) Is the difference by which the LUS’s control rights exceed her cash-flow rights
inversely related with the firm’s performance?
d) Do variables reflecting the LUS’s characteristics (dummies expressing if it is a
foreign firm, a family, the state, or a privately held firm) influence firm performance?
e) Is firm performance sensitive to other governance characteristics, such as whether
the firm is listed on the stock market, whether it is part of a pyramidal scheme of
control, or whether it issued preferred stocks with no voting rights?
Since time-series cross-section data on more than 600 companies for every year from
1997 to 2002 can be tapped from the IANs and DFP firms filed to the CVM, a panel
data model is used to test directly the impact of some ownership and control variables
on firm performance. The form of the regression model is:
yit = αi + β‘xit + γ‘zit + εit, where
•  yit is the dependent variable expressing some rate of return of firm i in the year t;
•  xit represents a set of explanatory variables involving different aspects of firms’
ownership and control, such as the share of cash-flow rights and of voting rights
for the LUS, the magnitude of deviation between these two variables, non-
monotonic measures of the LUS’s ownership and voting concentration (dummy
with value 1 if the LUS has a stake above 50 or 66 percent of the total voting
rights), a dummy for pyramidal arrangements of ownership, the percentage of the
firm’s total shares accounted for preferred stocks with no voting rights,
characteristics of the controlling shareholders (dummies for foreign firms, family,
and the state); and dummy for publicly traded firms;
•  zit is a vector of control variables representing firm, industry and macroeconomic
attributes. Data availability limited the number of variables of control to the
following ones: the firm’s main sector of activity,
2 its size (measured by the value
in real terms of the firm’s total assets), its growth opportunities (proxied by the
rate of growth in its assets over the previous year), and its financial structure. Two
measures of financial leverage were calculated: the value of long-term liabilities
                                                
2 The 76 industries defined by the two-digit SIC were reclassified into 20 industries: 1) agriculture,
forestry and fishing; 2) food; 3) textile and apparel; leather; 4) paper and allied products; lumber and
wood products; 5) petroleum refining; oil and gas extraction; 6) chemicals; rubber and plastic products;
7) mining of nonmetallic minerals; stone, clay, glass and concrete products; 8) metal mining; primary
metal industries; fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment; 9)
industrial and commercial machinery and computer; transportation equipment; 10) electronic and other
electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment; 11) electric, gas and sanitary
services; 12) construction; 13) retail trade; 14) eating and drinking places; hotels and other lodging
places; 15) transportation; 16) communications; postal service; 17) finance, insurance and real estate;
18) holdings; 19) health services; social services; 20) other services.11
and the value of short-term liabilities as proportions of the total value of assets.
Unavailability of data prevented the inclusion of a variable proxing for share in
the product market. Fixed effects of firms and sectors as well as of time were
taken into account;
•  εit is the regression error.
Given that the sample involves both listed and unlisted companies and considering
the low liquidity characterizing the shares of most of the listed firms, the
measurement of firms’ performance was based on accounting data instead on stock
market data.
3 Two accounting rates of return were tested: the ratio of net profits over
total assets and the ratio of operating profits over total assets. The data needed to
calculate these ratios are available on the “Demonstrativos Financeiros Padronizados”
(DFP) that limited liability companies have to file to CVM every year. Figures for net
profits and operating profits are found in the income statement of the companies,
while data for the total value of assets at the year-end are found in the balance sheets.
On the grounds of the incentive effects, it is expected that regressions present a
positive sign for the coefficient of cash-flow rights and for the dummy representing
whether the firm is listed on the stock exchange. Contrariwise, the entrenchment
effect suggests that the sign is likely negative for the coefficients of the variables
representing voting rights, the disparity between cash-flow and voting rights, the
percentage of preferred stocks with no voting rights in the firm’s capital, and
dummies for offshore LUS and for firms belonging to pyramids.
For Jensen (1986) debt may operate as a mechanism of disciplining managers,
preventing them from wasting free cash flows in bad investments. Increasing the risk
of default, higher leverage would put pressure on managers to yield cash flow in
order to service the debt, otherwise they would suffer the bankruptcy costs. On the
other hand, high levels of leverage combined with limited liability may engender
moral hazard behaviour, inducing management to adopt riskier projects. Thus, the
sign of the coefficient of leverage variables is ex ante ambiguous. The regressor
annual growth rate in the value of assets, used as a proxy for growth opportunities,
generally presents a positive sign in former studies. As regards the size of the firm,
bigger firms tend to be better monitored by outside investors, to disclose more
information, and to have reputation concerns, but they face more limited prospects of
growth.
IV. Results
We tried several regressions to assess whether some variables grasping ownership
and control characteristics were associated with firms’ performance. These
experiments were based on insights stemming from previous empirical and theoretical
studies. The regressions included the following potential explanatory variables:
voting rights, cash-flow rights, dummies for voting rights above 50 and 66 percent,
the divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights, quadratic and cubic terms
for voting and cash-flow rights, preferred stocks with no voting rights as a percentage
of the firm’s whole capital, dummies representing whether the firm is listed on the
Brazilian stock exchange (listed), whether it belongs to a pyramid arrangement,
                                                
3 Many studies use rates of return involving stock market data – such as price-earnings ratio, dividend
yield, market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s q. Joh (2003) argues that accounting profitability rates are
likely a better performance measure than stock marked-based measures because capital markets are not
perfectly efficient (implying that stock prices do not reflect all available information) and accounting
profitability grapples more directly the level of “financial survivability” of firms than stock market
value does.12
whether it is involved with cross-shareholdings, and the largest ultimate shareholder’s
identity (if it is a mutual fund, a foundation, a foreign company, the state etc.). We
also took into account two leverage variables (long-term liabilities over assets, long
leverage, and short-term liabilities over assets, short leverage) and their respective
lagged values, a proxy for firm size (the value of assets in 2006 real terms, and its
lagged value), and a variable representing the annual growth rate in the value of
assets. Furthermore, we broke down the sample into quartiles according to the value
of firms’ assets, in order to capture whether there were idiosyncratic characteristics
distinguishing larger from smaller firms. Two measures of accounting performance
were considered as dependent variables: net profits over assets and operational profits
over assets. And finally, we include controls for fixed effects of time and sectors. The
estimator employed was the OLS estimator with robust (Huber-White, “sandwich”)
standard errors.
The main results of the panel data analysis are reported in Tables 7 and 8. When
regressing operating profits on assets, cash-flow rights are not significant while the
dummy representing voting rights exceeding 66 percent is significant (at 5 percent)
and the two leverage variables (both presenting negative coefficients) as well as the
size of firms (with positive coefficient) are highly significant.
4
Regarding dummies for the identity of the largest ultimate shareholder, those for
voting agreements, foundation and mutual fund are significant and show negative
coefficients. This indicates that if the LUS belongs to one of those three categories
her firm’s operational return on assets tends to be lower than if she were a family.
The dummy for offshore LUS is significant and its coefficient is positive. The R-
squared is high (86.2 percent).
A telling result emerges when, using the same model, we broke down the sample into
quartiles according to the value of firms’ assets (see Table 8). Only for the smallest
quartile the dummy for voting rights exceeding 66 percent is significantly (at 1
percent) related to the ratio of operational profits over assets, being the corresponding
coefficient sign in accordance with what was expected. Cash flow rights become
significant for just the two intermediate quartiles, but the sign of its coefficient
(negative) runs counter what was predicted. Leverage measures keep their
significance and coefficient signs along the four quartiles.
For the two largest quartiles, preferred stocks with no voting share as a percentage of
total capital and the dummy for pyramid are significantly and negatively related with
the ratio of operating profits over assets (respectively, at 1 and 5 percent). It is
noteworthy that the dummy for foreign LUS is significantly and positively associated
with the dependent variable. For the largest quartile, the dummies for listed firms
(positive coefficient) and for firms whose LUS is a privately held firm (negative
coefficient) present 1 percent significance. Dummies for voting agreements and for
mutual funds are also significant (at 5 percent) and both have negative coefficients. It
should be noted that while the R-squared is 89.7 percent for the first quartile, it
plunges to 35.5 percent for the highest quartile, suggesting that other non-observable,
firm-specific factors (such as product differentiation, market power, quality etc.) may
be relevant to account for the largest firms’ rates of return.
If performance is measured by the ratio of net profits over assets, the relationships
with ownership and control variables lose significance, except the dummy for
                                                
4 Other regressions revealed that the regressors magnitude of voting rights, the dummy for voting
rights above 50 percent, and divergence of rights are not significant. Adding quadratic terms for voting
rights and cash-flow rights, the square of voting rights becomes significant; adding quadratic and cubic
terms, none of them is significant. Neither is the rate of growth in assets.13
offshore (positive coefficient). Short-term and long-term leverages and size maintain
1 percent significance.
In the light of the results above reported, some remarks can be made. First of all,
there is fairly solid evidence that firms with high voting rights by the largest ultimate
shareholders tend to exhibit low operating returns on assets, supporting the view of
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder and the
dominance of entrenchment effects. However, the empirical models tested here failed
to provide evidence endorsing either the positive impact of cash-flow rights or the
negative impact of the “wedges” separating voting rights from cash-flow rights on
firms’ profitability ratios, what runs counter the expropriation thesis. The non-
significance of those two explanatory variables should be probably ascribed to the
great chunk of Brazilian firms with very high cash-flow rights held by the LUSs.
Whereas the mean ownership concentration of publicly traded firms in South Korea
over the period 1993-1997 was 31.7 percent (Joh, 2003), in Brazil it averaged 46.4
percent between 1997-2002, with 42 percent of the sample LUSs holding more than
50 percent of their firms’ capital.
With respect to the LUS’s identity, the dummies capturing it, when significant, show
as a rule negative coefficients, suggesting that families are not the worst category in
terms of impact on the profitability ratio. That is the case for voting agreements,
foundations, and mutual funds. Noteworthy exceptions are when the LUS is an
offshore or, for the largest firms, a foreign investor, both tending to yield a positive
effect on the operational return on assets. It can be argued that the positive coefficient
for foreign firms is accounted for their higher disclosure requirements, but by the
same token it was expected that lower disclosure of offshore firms entailed a negative
coefficient.
For the biggest firms, there is a significant and negative association between on the
one hand belonging to a pyramidal ownership and issuing preferred stocks with no
voting rights and on the other the operating return on assets. This corroborates the
account that mechanisms for diverting voting rights from cash-flow rights is driven
by expropriation motives rather than to ameliorate the trade-off between liquidity and
incentives for monitoring stemming from voting concentration. Being listed at the
Bovespa affects significantly (at 1 percent) the operational return on assets for the top
quartile firms.
The consistently and highly significantly negative association between leverage (for
both short-term as well as long-term liabilities) and rate of return defies Jensen
(1986), who argues that higher leverage disciplines management and curbs free cash-
flow agency costs. One possible explanation of this divergence may lie in Brazilian
firms’ relatively low debt-equity ratios. Another possibility resides in firms’ low
availability of free cash flow.
5 Concerning the positive and highly significant
relationship between the size of the firms and returns on assets (measured either by
net or operational profits over assets), it may be reflecting returns on scale and market
power.
Among possible shortcomings of the empirical models adopted, three should be
emphasised. First, robustness concerning measures of the rate of return is not strong.
Regressing the dependent variable net returns on assets makes non-significant almost
all ownership and control variables; results are also highly sensitive if returns on net-
worth are chosen as the measure for profitability. Second, the models did not tackle
                                                
5  See Joh (2003). She also finds a highly negative relationship between leverage and profitability
ratios for Korean firms.14
endogeneity issues. Finally, lack of data led to the omission of a variable capturing




cash-flow rights 0.036 0.025
dummy for voting rights above 66% -0.054 † -0.039
dummy for pyramid 0.013 -0.012
dummy for listed 0.012 -0.010
dummy for offshore 0.052 * 0.071 †
long leverage -0.609 ‡ -0.612 ‡
short leverage -1.199 ‡ -0.872 ‡
pn with no voting rights 0.035 -0.018
size (assets) 1E-09 ‡ 8E-10 ‡
dummy for voting agreement -0.050 * 0.006
dummy for state 0.040 0.031
dummy for foreign -0.017 0.027
dummy for foundation -0.080 † -0.042
dummy for mutual funds -0.075 * -0.032
dummy for pension funds -0.038 -0.061
dummy for privately-held firm 0.083 0.067





























* Significant at 10%, † at 5%, and ‡ at 1% level.
Standard errors in brackets.
Time and Sector Fixed-Effects omitted.15
Table 8
Estimation Results for Operating Profits over Assets by Asset Quartiles
cash-flow rights 0.218 -0.060 * -0.051 ‡ -0.017
dummy for voting rights above 66% -0.275 ‡ 0.020 0.008 0.007
dummy for pyramid 0.072 0.010 -0.030 ‡ -0.011 †
dummy for listed -0.167 * 0.053 ‡ 0.012 0.052 ‡
dummy for offshore 0.248 -0.090 ‡ -0.011 0.004
long leverage -0.629 ‡ -0.094 ‡ -0.294 ‡ -0.050 ‡
short leverage -1.245 ‡ -0.175 ‡ -0.172 ‡ -0.165 ‡
pn with no voting rights 0.242 0.015 -0.059 ‡ -0.041 ‡
size (assets) -5E-07 -7E-08 2E-08 ‡ 5E-11
dummy for voting agreement -0.206 † 0.071 † 0.015 -0.024 †
dummy for state -0.010 0.020 -0.014 -0.017
dummy for foreign -0.195 0.039 * 0.028 † 0.018 †
dummy for foundation -0.069 0.009 0.012 -0.015
dummy for mutual funds -0.313 * 0.042 0.023 -0.032 †
dummy for pension funds -0.356 -0.065 0.042 † -0.002
dummy for privately-held firm 0.309 * -0.024 -0.026 -0.051 ‡












































* Significant at 10%, † at 5%, and ‡ at 1% level.
Standard errors in brackets.
Time and Sector Fixed-Effects omitted.16
V. Concluding Remarks
It is widely acknowledged that corporate governance weaknesses in Brazil stem
primarily from the ample latitude controlling shareholders have for expropriating
minority investors. This is commonly attributed to poor investor protection granted by
the Brazilian corporate law, which though the recent reform in 2001/2002 remains
biased in favour of controlling shareholders. Corporate legislation provides
unequivocally ample room for control rights in excess of cash flow rights, notably
through the issuance of preferred shares with no voting rights, the use of pyramid
schemes, and allowing formal voting commitment among shareholders. Albeit
persuasive, this account lacks systematic empirical support. This paper tries to bridge
that gap by means of a time-series cross-sectional analysis covering more than 600
Brazilian limited liability companies, with annual data from 1997 to 2002, with a
view to evaluating the impact on firm performance of ownership and control variables
and of other governance variables.
This panel data analysis found pieces of evidence that vindicate some expectations.
First, LUS’s high voting rights (over 66 percent) are negatively associated with firms’
operational returns on assets. Second, pyramids and non-voting right shares as a
percentage of total shares are negatively correlated with the same return measure for
the largest firms. Third, the largest firms whose LUS is a foreign investor tend to
yield higher returns on assets than those controlled by families, while the opposite
occurs when the LUS is a privately-held firm or a shareholders’ voting agreement.
Forth, for the top 50 percent largest firms, pyramid ownership structures contribute to
render them systematically under-performing, result in accordance with Bebchuk et
al. (1999), Bebchuk (1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan and La Porta et al. (1999).
On the other hand, part of our findings does not endorse some expected results. First,
LUS’ higher cash-flow rights and lower discrepancy of rights are not associated with
firm’s higher performance, in disagreement with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Claessens et al. (2002). Second, the tests do not confirm that managers of firms
whose LUS is a mutual fund are better monitored and disciplined. Third, high debt-
equity ratios do not seem to operate as a disciplinary device, as argued by Jensen
(1986). Forth, an offshore LUS tends to deliver better, rather worse, firm
performance.
The assessment of the effects on profitability rates of ownership and control variables
as well of the type of owners may shed some light on the way legal reforms should be
undertaken in order to remove the obstacles hindering the development of the
Brazilian capital market. Needless to say that even compelling evidence supporting
changes in the legal environment regulating corporate governance would be far from
enough to put through efficiency-enhancement reforms in legislation. The frustrating
experience of the Brazilian corporate law reform in 2001 and 2002 is an illuminating
example of how politics of specific interest groups can defeat the economic logic.17
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